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Lars Korsell and Paul Larsson
Organized Crime the
Nordic Way
ABSTRACT
Organized crime in the Nordic countries shares some common traits and
usually takes the form of small and ﬂexible networks. There are very few,
if any, Maﬁa-like groups. The level of corruption of ofﬁcials is low and
the level of violence between groups is, with some exceptions, quite low.
Organized crime reﬂects the societies, the economy, and the historic and
cultural background of the Nordic countries. Organized crime can not be
said to be strongly integrated in the central trade and industry. Criminal
networks are not a new feature. There have been well-established groups
of smugglers and illegal makers of alcohol since the early twentieth cen-
tury. Organized crime as a topic, problem, and social phenomenon was
not focused on before the early 1990s.
Organized crime is often presented by the media and politicians as an
uncontrollable force synonymous with violent and serious crime (Lars-
son 2008b; Ingvaldsen and Lundgren Sørli 2009; Korsell, Skinnari, and
Vesterhav 2009). With some notable exceptions, this view is erroneous.
Organized crime mirrors the basic traits of the Nordic societies. The
level of corruption by organized criminals is low compared with most
other countries and the damage to society seems to be relatively small
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( Johansen 1996; Korsell, Wallstrom, and Skinnari 2007; Larsson
2008b; Skinnari, Weding, and Korsell 2008; Baard et al. 2009). Cor-
ruption of public ofﬁcials has no signiﬁcant history in the Scandinavian
countries, although this is not to say they are without corruption
(Spencer et al. 2006; Viuhko and Jokinen 2009). There are many well-
known examples of corruption from the last decade, but most involve
private businesses or relate to municipal and other local authorities and
their dealings with local industry (S. Andersson 2002; Korsell 2008;
Larsson 2008b). There are ample instances of corruption associated
with shipping and international trade (Bratt 1988; Wa¨sterfors 2004).
However, corruption as described in international literature, by orga-
nized criminals in connection with their activities, seems to be at a very
low level (Baard et al. 2009).
Organized crime in the Nordic countries is neither systemic nor
embedded in the legal economy. The merging of the legal and illegal
economies is still at a low level ( Johansen 1996, 2009; Skinnari, Wed-
ing, and Korsell 2008; Korsell, Skinnari, and Vesterhav 2009). That
politicians or public ofﬁcials have direct contact with criminal groups,
or that industry regularly makes deals with them, are not Nordic re-
alities.
There is a gap between academic deﬁnitions of organized crime and
practical understanding and uses of the concept. The main focus of
the police is on drug-related crimes, and smuggling is also important.
There often is a lack of understanding of the importance of economic
forms of organized crime and of markets for criminal or “tax-free”
goods and services. To a certain extent this reﬂects the organization of
the police and public authorities; the units working with economic
crime are commonly perceived as being outside the “ordinary” police
(Alvesalo 1998). Sweden, where the strategy “go for the money” is an
important part of law enforcement and is applied in collaboration
among different authorities, is an exception to this rule (Vesterhav,
Forsman, and Korsell 2008).
Beside drug-related crime, organized crime as presented by the me-
dia, politicians, and law enforcement agencies has focused on visible
gangs, especially bikers and violent “robber gangs” (Bjo¨rk 2006; Lars-
son 2008b; Korsell, Skinnari, and Vesterhav 2009; Korsell et al. 2010).
The threats from these gangs are overestimated, while the effects of
the criminality of more cautious entrepreneurs have been underesti-
mated.
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Trafﬁcking in human beings for purposes of sexual exploitation is an
important political issue ( Justitiedepartementet 2010, p. 49). Sweden,
Norway, Finland, and Iceland all have legislation directed against the
purchasing of sexual services in different contexts (see Skilbrei and
Hølmstro¨m, in this volume).
To understand crime in a country or region you need basic knowl-
edge of its history and characteristics. There are differences among the
Nordic countries, but they are bound together by historical and cul-
tural similarities. Compared with the United States, Eastern European,
Latin American, or Italian descriptions of organized crime, the Nordic
reality is very different. Nils Christie’s criticism of Donald Cressey’s
Theft of the Nation (1969) provides a good illustration (Christie 1970).
Christie was skeptical of the idea of a tight, hierarchical organization
and of the sources on which Cressey based his work. Kettil Bruun
(1970) criticized Cressey’s deﬁnition of the term “organized crime” and
wanted to open the deﬁnition up to cover forms of white-collar and
high-status crime. Christie and Bruun showed that the concept could
be viewed in more theoretical terms and that the examples typically
used were American. Thirty years later Per Ole Johansen (2005) wrote
of organized crime “the Norwegian way.” We would expand this phrase
and coin the term “organized crime the Nordic way.” Tage Alalehto
(2009) asked “Is Sweden really like Italy?” in respect of the focus on
organized crime.
These differences in view reﬂect the social realities that shape the
manner in which crime is committed, structured, and handled by the
authorities. The characteristics of organized crime in the Nordic coun-
tries challenge general theories that presuppose certain central features
that are absent from or of little importance in the Nordic region. Or-
ganized crime in the Nordic countries does not generally corrupt the
police, customs, or politicians. It is not particularly violent. Even if
parts of it have international links, it is mainly local, and if interna-
tional, it is usually assimilated into Nordic societies.
Since at least 1500, Sweden and Denmark have been preeminent
among the Nordic countries. Norway, Finland, and Iceland have been
dominated for hundreds of years by these two “superpowers.”1 Finland
is the odd man out. For long periods its main attention and activity
1 In the Viking age and later (AD 800–1300) Norway was a powerful kingdom that
dominated huge areas.
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were directed toward Russia. The Finnish language is unrelated to any
of the other Nordic tongues.
Some traits are often described as typically Nordic (Ramsøy 1974;
Hofstede 1989).
Peace and Freedom. With the exception of Finland, and the German
occupations of Norway and Denmark, the Nordic countries have a
long history of peace and freedom. Their history is therefore very dif-
ferent from, for example, Sicily’s tradition of resistance against foreign
domination, present-day political corruption, and a culture of suspicion
of state power (Alalehto 2009).
A Strong and Benign State. In all Nordic countries the state has a
special position. Sweden and Norway have been social democracies
since the 1930s and political tensions are generally low key. The trade
unions and the employers’ organizations have traditionally worked well
together. In comparison with many other regions the number of strikes
and other conﬂicts has been low. The state is normally viewed as a
representative of the people. It is usually perceived as an institution
that beneﬁts the population by providing schooling, public health, and
security. There has been a recent neoconservative wind, but the effects,
especially on the privatization of public services, have generally been
less dramatic than in many other European states.
The state and its representatives are generally viewed positively. The
public generally trusts the police, customs, and the justice system, and
their abilities to solve problems. Corruption is seen as un-Nordic, even
if certain forms of corruption, often in connection with private ﬁrms
and municipal authorities, seem to be quite common (S. Andersson
2002; Karlsson and Korsell 2007; Gedde-Dahl, Halstad, and Magnus-
sen 2008; Norin O¨stin et al. 2010). The general belief in the public
sector and especially the justice system provides a foundation for a high
level of trust among the citizens (Rothstein 2003). People trust one
other; there is little room for a narrow collectivistic belief in the family
and a system of honor and revenge (Lappalainen 1993).
Democratic Societies. The Nordic countries have a fairly long tra-
dition of democracy, even if Finland’s history is more dramatic. It was
for a century part of the Russian empire and was liberated as a result
of the 1917 Revolution, after which it went through a long bloody civil
war. Local communities and their organizational predecessors in the
Nordic countries have long been independent, which gave rise to de-
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mocracies close to the people. This local democracy has stimulated
citizens to take responsibility for long-term and collectivistic matters.
Afﬂuent Societies since World War II. Norway and Finland have long
histories of relative poverty. Nonetheless, the Nordic countries have
experienced tremendous growth in wealth since World War II. This
afﬂuence has been very evenly distributed compared with most other
nations. The strong ideal of equality combined with the victory of the
social democratic idea has produced a belief that we all are equal, even
if social statistics clearly document the existence of social classes. Social
mobility is fairly high, and student ﬁnancing schemes make it possible
for almost everyone to obtain a proper education. The welfare system
has provided a security net that still works well, and unemployment
rates have been low. Norway has long had labor shortages and has had
to import workers from, especially, Sweden and Denmark.
Gender Equity. The Nordic countries are progressive when it comes
to equality between the sexes. Prostitution and pimping are lower than
in many other countries. Since 1999 in Sweden, it has been a crime to
buy sexual services, a measure premised on notions of equality. Norway
and Iceland has recently adopted the Swedish approach, and in Finland
it is a criminal offence to buy sexual services from trafﬁcked persons.
Monoethnic and Religious Societies. Historically, the Nordic countries
have had three major ethnic groups. One is the Sami, who live in the
northern regions of Sweden, Norway, Finland, and Russia. The second
is the Germanic peoples of Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, and Norway.
The Finns have roots in Eastern Europe. Until quite recently these
countries have been predominantly white. Large-scale immigration
dates from the late 1960s. Today, Sweden is a multiethnic society. An
overwhelming segment of the population of the Nordic countries be-
longs to Protestant churches, even if most people are rather passive
celebrants.
Norms and values systems are shared by a majority of the popula-
tion, although these beliefs vary. Large parts of these countries are
rural, especially in Norway, Sweden, and Finland. There are few large
cities or urban areas; only Stockholm and Copenhagen have more than
1 million inhabitants. The sparse populations of these countries also
explain why it was not possible to establish large factories to produce
moonshine or to undertake other forms of large-scale organized crime
( Johansen 1996, 2004a). The result has been an organized criminality
in which “small is beautiful.”
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The historical conditions that give rise to Maﬁa-like organizations
elsewhere have not been present in the Nordic states (Ianni and Reuss-
Ianni 1972; Paoli 2003). The question arises why, despite all these
positive factors, organized crime has developed in the Nordic coun-
tries. The ﬁrst answer is the invisible hand of the market (Korsell,
Skinnari, and Vesterhav 2009; Korsell et al. 2010). Until the end of
time there will be a demand for illegal, cheap, and tax-free goods and
services, and criminal entrepreneurs will always try to supply this de-
mand if there is money to be made. The division of labor, criminal
business strategies, and security measures result in an organizational
approach to running such businesses. The second answer is that people
who feel excluded sometimes fall for the temptation of belonging to a
group and being someone (Larsson 2008b). The growth of gangs has
been a phenomenon of the last couple of decades and may indicate a
trend toward a more divided society, with marginalization of certain
groups and growing social problems, inequality, and lost opportunities
(cf. Bjo¨rk 2006).
This essay has six sections. The ﬁrst describes the various ways—
mostly not very useful—Nordic governments have deﬁned organized
crime in legislation. The second discusses the forms organized crime
has taken. Maﬁa-type organizations are conspicuous in their absence.
Biker gangs, groups organized to service illegal markets, and ethnic
gangs often associated with immigrant groups are the principal orga-
nized crime groups. Section III discusses the four principal activities—
drugs, untaxed alcohol, human smuggling, and money laundering. Sec-
tion IV discusses government responses and Section V speculates about
the future.
I. Deﬁnitions of Organized Crime
A Swedish deﬁnition of organized crime was formulated in the 1970s
in order to devise a questionnaire intended to survey the extent of
organized crime within the country (AMOB 1977; Lindgren 2000a;
Korsell 2006). The following criteria were deﬁned as central:
• organized crime should take the form of an activity;
• this activity should be criminalized in itself (in contrast to economic
crime, which is committed in a legal activity, a company);
• the activity should have a continuous character;
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• the activity should have a ﬁxed direction (but several branches of
crime are possible);
• the activity should be capable of being planned and guided in advance
with a reasonable level of certainty;
• the activity should have connection to permanent premises, places,
or areas;
• the activity should include several participants;
• the participants should be organized within a decision and functional
hierarchy (they have different powers and undertake different tasks)
in which each single member is interchangeable;
• decisions, information, communication, and the ﬂow of money, com-
modities, and services follow certain predetermined patterns.
This deﬁnition is similar to the commonly applied 11-point deﬁni-
tion of the European Union, with the exception that the latter stresses
the capacity to protect the organization and facilitate its criminal ac-
tivities through unlawful means such as violence and corruption (Kor-
sell, Skinnari, and Vesterhav 2009). Contemporary U.S. deﬁnitions
from the 1970s also stressed that the capacity for unlawful inﬂuence
distinguishes organized crime from crime in general (Clinard and
Quinney 1967). However, the elements of violence and corruption are
comparatively uncommon in Sweden and the other Nordic countries
and the Swedish deﬁnition still works well. Even if violence and cor-
ruption are linked to organized crime, criminal activities in many cases
are carried out in a businesslike manner, and criminal actors try to
avoid conﬂict and violence. Organized crime tends to use subtle and
nonpunishable forms of inﬂuence such as harassment (Baard et al.
2009; Korsell, Skinnari, and Vesterhav 2009). However, for speciﬁc
gangs, in which brotherhood and a feeling of solidarity are important,
unlawful inﬂuence can be a way to strengthen their image, especially
for newcomers (Baard al. 2009).
The 1970 Swedish deﬁnition of organized crime was forgotten for
several decades and it does not play a role today. Instead, Swedish law
enforcement agencies use the 11-point EU deﬁnition (Korsell, Skin-
nari, and Vesterhav 2009), as do Norway, Denmark, and Finland (Po-
litidirektoratet 2003b; Cornils and Greve 2004; Junninen 2006). Nor-
way and Finland also have statutory deﬁnitions of organized crime.
The “Maﬁa paragraph” in the Norwegian Penal Code from 2003,
states: “An organized criminal group is here deﬁned as an organized
group of three or more persons whose main purpose is to commit an
526 Lars Korsell and Paul Larsson
act that is punishable by imprisonment for a term of not less than three
years, or whose activity largely consists of committing of such acts”
(Act of 22 May 1902 no. 10, General Civil Penal Code, sec. 60a). This
deﬁnition is vague and circular (Ingvaldsen and Lundgren Sørli 2009).
It has been used on few occasions—perhaps in fewer than 20 court
cases. Its vagueness made the law an ideal target for the defense. Sec-
tion 60a has been used in some rather well-known criminal cases, in-
cluding the Nokas robbery, the Munch trials, and a trafﬁcking case in
Trondheim relating to prostitution and trafﬁcking of women from the
Baltic.2
The Norwegian paragraph resembles chapter 17 of the Finnish Pe-
nal Code as amended in 2003: “A criminal organization is deﬁned as
a structured association, established over a period of time, of at least
three persons acting in concert to commit the offences referred to in
subsection 1” (Penal Code of Finland, chap. 17 sec. 1a [142/2003]).3
The Finnish deﬁnition also has been applied only a few times
(Viuhko and Jokinen 2009).
II. Organized Criminals
The Indigenous organized criminals are principally bikers and small-
scale illegal enterprises. Ethnic gangs based in immigrant communities
have emerged, and international organized groups have made appear-
ances, on a small scale in both cases.
Academics and practitioners (e.g., police) hold conﬂicting views on
whether biker groups are to be understood as organized criminal
groups. Many biker group members are registered for criminal offenses
(two-thirds in Norway), but few have been convicted for any serious
offenses. Crimes committed are not done by the groups themselves but
by individual members. The reason for mentioning bikers here is
mainly that they have come to symbolize organized crime in the Nor-
2 The Nokas robbery was the largest in Norwegian history (Fahsing and Gottschalk
2008; Ingvaldsen and Larsson 2009). The Munch case concerned the theft of the two
paintings Scream and Madonna from the Munch museum in Oslo, which were later
recovered. The trafﬁcking case from Trondheim related primarily to Estonian women
held as prostitutes by Estonian criminals.
3 An unofﬁcial translation from the Ministry of Justice is available online at http://
www.ﬁnlex.ﬁ/pdf/saadkaan/E8890039.PDF. The Norwegian Code is online at http://
www.ub.uio.no/ujur/ulovdata/lov-19020522-010-eng.pdf ).
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dic countries, even if this view might be wrong (Korsell, Skinnari, and
Vesterhav 2009).
A. Bikers
If you ask about organized crime in an ordinary city in Sweden,
Norway, Finland, or Denmark, the answer could be: “We do not have
any problems with organized crime. There are no biker gangs here”
(Korsell et al. 2010). The bikers are motorcycle gangs whose members
are associated with criminal activity.
Biker groups appeared in the 1970s, but the “biker problem” was
ﬁrst recognized in Denmark in the early 1980s with the establishment
of Hells Angels (Cornils and Greve 2004; Larsson 2008b). They ap-
peared in Sweden, Finland, and Norway some years later. In Denmark
the problem was initially characterized as “criminal biker gangs,” but
in time that term was replaced by “organized biker crime” (Bay 1992,
1994). The biker clubs were seen as synonymous with organized crime.
The “Nordic biker war” between the Hells Angels and Bandidos
raged from 1995 to 1997. The struggle is often described by the police
as a war for control of drug markets, but it was more likely based on
personal conﬂicts dating far back in time. It spread to Norway, Finland,
and Sweden (Larsson 2008b). The level of violence was unprecedented.
Eleven people were killed and there were 74 attempted murders, open
shootouts, car bombs, and attacks on clubhouses with antitank rockets
(Cornils and Greve 2004; Rigspolitiet 2009). In Norway a clubhouse
in Drammen was bombed, leaving a burning house and one civilian
fatality. In a rocket attack against Hells Angels in Copenhagen, two
people were killed and 18 were injured. In Sweden, two people were
killed and there were about 20 attempted murders (Wierup and Lars-
son 2007).
Since the “Nordic Peace Treaty” was reached between the clubs in
1997, the level of violence has been low, even though the problem
has recently ﬂared up in Denmark. One aspect of that treaty was a
restriction on establishing new chapters. Recently, Outlaws MC has
expanded in Norway, possibly a result of the restrictions on Hells
Angels and Bandidos; and this situation may threaten the equilibrium.
With hindsight, Wierup and Larsson (2007, p. 127) observed that the
“war” was a violent marketing phase that established a “dangerous
reputation” that could be used for extortion and heavy-handed debt
collection.
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In all Nordic countries the outlaw biker gangs—the “one-percent”
biker clubs—are now common. The Danish police counted up to 80
different kinds of gangs with more than 900 associated individuals in
Denmark alone (Rigspolitiet 2009). There are some problems with
these numbers. They include one-percent groups, supporters, and what
the Danes call “bands.” Three hundred and ninety-six people are as-
sociated with Hells Angels, the supporter group AK81, and Bandidos.
There are approximately 180 members of immigrant street gangs (Ber-
lingske Tidende 2009). In Sweden, gangs are established in about 25
municipalities (Wierup and Larsson 2007). They are involved in drug
trafﬁcking and violent crime and are often in possession of illegal weap-
ons. Honor and a strong identity among the “brothers” easily result in
conﬂicts between different groups, especially between outlaw biker
groups such as Hells Angels and immigrant gangs (Larsson 2008b).
Since August 2008, the conﬂict has resulted in four deaths in Denmark,
a sensational ﬁgure for the Nordic countries.
In many ways Hells Angels and Bandidos gave meaning to the con-
cept of organized crime, especially after the Nordic biker war. Foreign
ideas and perspectives and especially EU regulation were imported by
the Nordic countries.4 In the background, there was also “traditional”
market-oriented organized crime dealing in drugs, alcohol, cigarettes,
and stolen goods.
In Norway after 2000, drug sections of the police were renamed
organized crime units. Drug squads were swallowed by organized crime
units and money earmarked for dealing with narcotics was diverted to
ﬁghting organized crime (Politidirektoratet 2005).
B. Small-Scale Criminal Entrepreneurs
Organized crime groups work best when they are hidden and quiet.
Junninen (2006) classiﬁes the Finnish criminal groups as semiorga-
nized. They have the characteristics and features of organized crime
but their activities are described as unprofessional and periodic to such
a degree that it is hard to deﬁne them as organized crime.5
This phenomenon resembles the evolving British market depicted
by Dorn, Murji, and South (1992). They describe seven forms of traf-
4 Norway is not a member of the European Union, like Sweden, Denmark, and
Finland, but has a number of treaties with the European Union and has committed
itself to harmonizing its laws with EU laws.
5 In such a way that they resemble what Reuter (1986) calls “disorganized crime.”
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ﬁcking “ﬁrms,” two of which are trading charities and criminal diver-
siﬁers. Swedish studies of organized drug trafﬁcking describe networks
of persons coming together in trafﬁcking projects in order to smuggle
or import drugs and distribute them (Korsell et al. 2005). A project
could be short-lived in order to purchase a quantity of drugs from a
speciﬁc vendor and then smuggle them. A project could also be a long-
term operation that consists of many consecutive projects. The groups
that undertake these projects are often small and ﬂexible; one person
might take part in one project and not in another, but there is a rather
stable core.
These small-scale networks are what Per Ole Johansen (2005) called
“organized crime Norwegian style” when he studied the history of
liquor smuggling. He contrasted the small, ﬂexible, and quite peaceful
networks with organized crime in other countries.
Trust and the capacity to remain silent are fundamental qualiﬁcations
in recruitment of participants to these projects (Skinnari, Vesterhav,
and Korsell 2007). Sensing danger and “remembering faces and know-
ing people and ‘reading’ their characters” are talents that enable smug-
glers to succeed (Gross 1992; Johansen 2005, p. 196; Larsson 2009b).
This requirement is a reason why organized crime groups tend to be
made up of brothers, relatives, close friends, and kin and why ethnicity
may provide extra security for those involved.
Some contacts, positions, and tasks are more important than others.
The most sensitive responsibility is to take care of the main stock of
drugs and to transport and store money (Skinnari, Vesterhav, and Kor-
sell 2007). In many instances, criminal entrepreneurs have chosen
“warehousemen” outside the criminal network, such as relatives,
alumni, or other persons without a record.
Couriers are often recruited from individuals outside the circle of
criminal acquaintances, the network in which coworkers are found. It
is often desirable that the couriers have as little knowledge as possible
of the business and it is not unusual to engage middlemen as courier
recruiters in order to create a watertight barrier (Korsell et al. 2005;
van Duyne and Levi 2005).
When a trafﬁcking project is undertaken, it often has some formal
organizational features (Korsell et al. 2005). Even if there are no large
drug trafﬁcking organizations to be found in the Nordic countries,
there are still some hierarchical elements in the groups that undertake
these projects. There are usually one or two people who make the plans
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and have contacts and provide the ﬁnance. Others do the trafﬁcking.
It is not unusual to have money couriers.
C. Ethnic Groups
Some ethnic groups are frequently connected with organized crime.
Russian and Estonian criminals are important in Finland (Viuhko and
Jokinen 2009). Ethnic gangs are more prominent in Sweden and Den-
mark than in Norway. The Pakistani gangs in Oslo are well known for
episodes of open violence, mainly between two rival groups (Næss
1999), and there have been open shootouts in the streets in Oslo. This
violence seems to be a consequence of old personal rivalries and con-
ﬂicts (Larsson 2008b).
Quite a few people in the organized crime milieu in Norway and
Sweden came as refugees in the 1990s in connection with the civil war
in former Yugoslavia. Some of these have gained reputations as rather
tough criminals and some work as enforcers. Kosovo-Albanians who
arrived at the same time, and who have been closely connected to the
import of and wholesale trade in heroin, are also well known to be
central to drug trafﬁcking to Norway and Sweden (Snertingdal 2007).
The Vietnamese are usually well integrated and law-abiding, but
there are well-known groups that mount large-scale shoplifting op-
erations in Norway. These groups have been active for many years
and are known to cover vast distances in southern Norway. They have
often specialized in shoplifting from certain shops, particularly those
selling perfume and women’s clothing and located in large malls.
Such theft has often been labeled petty, but the total volume has been
substantial.
The best-documented foreign groups operating in the Scandinavian
countries are generally—but possibly mistakenly—known as Lithua-
nians. For more than a decade small groups of people with Lithuanian
passports have stolen large volumes of razor blades, cell phones, nylon
stockings, and other items and sent them back home. In recent years
they have stolen larger items, such as outboard motors and TV sets.
One problem in dealing with Lithuanian groups is that few know their
identity or whether they really are from Lithuania. There is evidence
that many of them have fake passports bought at the market in Kaunas.
In the last couple of years the activity of so-called mobile criminal
groups has grown. These commit crimes mainly for proﬁt, such as
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theft, pick pocketing, and robbery. Today this activity is dominated by
Polish, Lithuanian, and Romanian groups.
D. The Threat from Abroad
Organized crime in Scandinavia is usually associated in Scandinavian
minds with threats from abroad and from strangers ( Johansen 2004b).
The organized criminal is not the boy next door; he has to be remote
and vague in order to be viewed as truly threatening. This is one reason
why trafﬁckers in alcohol were never viewed as real organized crimi-
nals; their crimes were often considered less serious.
With the fall of the Iron Curtain and demise of the Soviet Union
came the fear of hordes from the East. This fear is not exclusive to
the Nordic countries; it was strong in Europe and the European Union
(Levi 2002). Fear of the East appears to be stronger the farther one is
from a border with Russia. The ﬁrst half of the 1990s saw periodic
media attention to the “Russian Maﬁa.” It was often said that Russian
groups were taking over gambling, drug markets, prostitution, and sim-
ilar illicit markets and behaviors. The general belief was that these
groups were so ruthless and hard-boiled that local crime groups would
be unable to resist them. Police statements were much more sober.
Intelligence analyses did not document any wave of Russian Maﬁa–
type groups.
A reality often overlooked by those predicting an invasion by foreign
groups is that organized crime must have strong local support to work
efﬁciently and safely (Fijnaut 2002; Fijnaut and Paoli 2004; Korsell,
Skinnari, and Vesterhav 2009). Otherwise, the risk of being caught or
swindled is too great. Speculations about the import of organized crime
from abroad, especially from Eastern Europe, were exaggerated. It is
as difﬁcult for “them” to get established in the Nordic countries as it
is for “us” to keep the police away, make local contacts, and learn how
to behave in a new and hostile environment. However, because of its
geographic position and close relations, and because Finnish and Es-
tonian are related languages, Finland has elements of Russian and Es-
tonian organized crime groups ( Junninen and Aromaa 1999; Viuhko
and Jokinen 2009).
Swedish drug trafﬁcking researchers have observed that the police
often use ethnic names for different groups, such as “the Poles” (Kor-
sell et al. 2005). Deeper study of these networks showed that the per-
petrators were not only from Poland but came also from several other
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countries, Nordic ones. One explanation for the police practice is that
the police need to have names for these groups in order to keep them
separate for analytical and strategic purposes; the names do not nec-
essarily give an accurate picture of the ethnic origins of those involved.
Varese (2006) posed the question whether the Italian Maﬁa could
establish itself outside Italy. He considered their method of recruitment
through families an obstacle to expansion. The Maﬁa do not trust peo-
ple with whom they do not have strong ties. Alalehto (forthcoming)
concludes that Sweden should not fear an invasion of foreign Maﬁa
organizations. Most forms of organized crime result from speciﬁc re-
gional and even local conditions; cultural and economic climates are
of great importance. Illegal and legal economies can be properly un-
derstood only as reﬂecting the local background and historical condi-
tions. Organized crime groups from Russia, Mexico, Sicily, or other
distant places will stand out as, for example, African heroin dealers in
Oslo have sometimes done. They attract too much attention and do
not know how to conduct business successfully. Foreign groups must
also make contact with local criminal networks if they are to do busi-
ness since these markets are not open, but are gated and closed (Paoli
2002).
III. Organized Crime Activities
Organized crime as a distinct phenomenon must be distinguished from
criminal activities that require organization to be carried out. In Scan-
dinavia, activities of the latter kind center on illegal markets—in drugs,
alcohol, and human smuggling—and money laundering.
A. The War on Drugs
The complete history of the Nordic war on drugs has yet to be
written.6 It had similarities to international developments during the
same period. The term “war on drugs” was coined by President Nixon
four decades ago. It is impossible to understand what happened in the
Nordic countries without taking account of American and international
inﬂuences.
Drugs are nothing new in the Nordic countries. It is said that can-
nabis seeds were found in the Oseberg ship in a Viking burial mound.
6 Important contributions have been made by Christie and Bruun (1985), Tham
(1996), and Kassman (1998).
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Until the 1960s consumption of different drugs was limited (Lind
1976). Drug use was viewed primarily as a health problem and not as
something to be regulated by penal laws, the police, and punishment
(Larsson 2009a).
After the mid-1960s, perceptions of drugs and their use changed
dramatically. This change was often linked to the emergence of new
recreational drugs and their use by youth groups. Something like a
moral panic, created by sensational media, focused especially on young
people using hash and LSD. In the beginning, much attention was
directed toward cannabis; in the 1980s heroin came to be seen as the
main drug, followed by ecstasy at the end of the last century and co-
caine most recently. The Nordic countries, however, with the exception
of Denmark, are at the bottom of European rankings of use and ex-
perimentation with drugs, except for alcohol consumption by students
(Hibell et al. 2009).
A new element in the Nordic drug market are the marijuana plan-
tations, some on an almost an industrial scale, that have been raided
by the police in recent years. The production of marijuana on this scale
is something new; rented houses were rebuilt to house fertilizing and
heating equipment, and electricity was stolen from the grid. This mode
of production is well known abroad (van Duyne and Levi 2005).
One lesson from the war on drugs has been that massive use of police
resources and harsh penalties have had unintended consequences.
Among them is a professionalization of the market and the actors.
Aggressive law enforcement seems to have strengthened the market for
illegal drugs and made it more adaptable (Larsson 2008a). The volume
of drugs smuggled into the Nordic countries seems to be greater today
than ever before. Their use has not grown dramatically and the prices
of drugs have dropped so that illegal drugs today are inexpensive, even
on the street. Heroin costs a fraction of what it did in the 1980s (Bret-
teville-Jensen and Biørn 2004). With the high price of alcohol, hash,
cannabis, and other drugs may often be cheaper than legal drinks
(Larsson 2006, 2008b, 2009b).
B. Alcohol
From November 1916 to 1955, Sweden had restrictions on how
much alcohol a person could buy (Bjo¨r 1985; H. Andersson 2002).
Finland had total prohibition between 1919 and 1931. Denmark chose
another way and imposed high taxes on alcohol. Norway, one of the
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world’s leading shipping nations, partial prohibition from 1917 to 1927
( Johansen 1993). Norwegian companies were heavily involved in
smuggling alcohol to America’s Rum Row in the 1920s ( Johansen
1993, 2004a).
During and after World War I, when prohibition and regulation
drained the Nordic countries of legal alcohol, entrepreneurs seized on
the opportunity to supply the market with liquor (Bjo¨r 1985; Lenke
1985; H. Andersson 2002). Algoth Niska, “the king of smugglers,”
came from Finland and shipped alcohol from Baltic harbors to Finland
and Sweden. Small, fast boats ferried cans of liquor to clandestine har-
bors From freighters anchored in international waters, with 20,000–
50,000 liters of alcohol in their holds; where lorries waited on shore
with their headlights switched off. Algoth Niska described his adven-
turous life, playing cat-and-mouse with the customs and making dra-
matic escapes with support from thirsty and grateful citizens (Niska
1931). In Norway the smuggler Arthur Omre (1935) gives similar de-
scription of big-time smuggling in his famous novel Smugglers.
Algoth Niska’s and Arthur Omre’s successors continue to provide
the market with alcohol ( Johansen 2009; Sjo¨strand 2009). With the
end of prohibition came the Nordic system of state monopolies and
high taxes as a weapon against the evil of drink.7 Wine, liquor, and to
a certain extent strong beer were channeled into state-controlled im-
port and sales systems.
High prices and the use of rationing led to a new market for smug-
glers who could provide cheaper booze than the state could. Johansen
has documented traditions in smuggling; some of the existing networks
can be traced back to the Prohibition Era. One of his books has the
telling title The Market That Would Not Die. Son followed father and
new methods were devised to respond to changing markets ( Johansen
1993). After the deaths of 11 people in Norway between 2001 and
2002 due to methanol poisoning from drinking smuggled booze, smug-
gling has switched from 60 or 96 percent spirits to wine and beer
( Johansen 2004a). Today, contraband spirits have become unfashion-
able among the young and consumers prefer exclusive brands rather
than cans of hard liquor ( Johansen 2009). This change has affected the
mode of smuggling.
The Norwegian smuggling networks had traits common with other
7 The continental and sinful Danes are the exceptions to this rule.
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forms of organized crime (Larsson 2008b; Korsell, Skinnari, and Ves-
terhav 2009). They were small and ﬂexible groups that could rapidly
adapt to new ways of doing business ( Johansen 2004a). Corruption of
police or custom ofﬁcers was unusual. Smugglers were typically white
and Norwegian, which was probably the corresponding pattern in Swe-
den and Finland. There are examples of foreigners, Germans for in-
stance, smuggling, some quite extensively, but Norwegians were pre-
dominant.
At times fortunes were made, but most of the time it was easy come,
easy go. In Norway some smuggling fortunes were converted into legal
business and social status. In recent years, smuggling of alcohol and
cigarettes is widely believed to be the most proﬁtable form of trafﬁck-
ing in the Nordic countries (Larsson 2008b).
The liberal EU legislation on importing alcohol for “private con-
sumption” has changed the landscape for smuggling and illegal distri-
bution (Korsell 2008). This legislation has made it easier for small-
scale smuggling and distribution parallel to the organized crime
operations, which use trucks and larger cargos.
C. Trafﬁcking in Human Beings
The Nordic countries are often a destination for trafﬁcked persons
but also serve as transit countries (Lehti and Aromaa 2004, 2006). Fin-
land is a transit country for Eastern Europeans and Sweden seems also
to play that role. Since the 1990s the volume of trafﬁcking has in-
creased. There is a demand in Western Europe for cheap labor and
trafﬁcking from the former Socialist countries can be more easily and
economically organized than from Southeast Asia, West Africa, and
Latin America (Lehti and Aromaa 2004).
The victims of trafﬁcking for prostitution are not only from eco-
nomically depressed areas but also often belong to disadvantaged social
and ethnic groups. They are often quite young and, seeking better
opportunities, fall prey to promises of good working conditions and
salaries (Lehti and Aromaa 2004; Forsman and Korsell 2008; Viuhko
and Jokinen 2009). The gloriﬁcation of the Western lifestyle attracts
young women looking for adventure and experiences (Englund et al.
2008; Viuhko and Jokinen 2009).
In Finland, women recruited for prostitution come from the Baltic
and Eastern European countries, mainly Russia and Estonia (Viuhko
and Jokinen 2009). Friends or acquaintances are important for recruit-
536 Lars Korsell and Paul Larsson
ment, but sometimes ﬁeld hands working for criminal networks play a
role. Quite often the trafﬁcked women have been involved in the sex
business in their countries of origin. Some women are recruited from
brothels in Tallinn and other cities.
The criminal trafﬁcking networks in general are small and not very
hierarchical (Viuhko and Jokinen 2009). Still, the criminal activities are
often well planned and organized and the perpetrators use diverse
forms of control to keep the women in prostitution. The perpetrators
are mainly indigenous Finns or come from Russia or Estonia. The
closeness to these countries and the inﬂuence of Eastern European
styles of organized crime makes Finland different from the other Nor-
dic countries. According to Viuhko and Jokinen (2009) there is ongoing
debate about how much support and help foreign perpetrators receive
from the Finns. Some claim that foreign organized crime networks
have acclimatized to the local environment; others stress the impor-
tance of the local links.
Eastern Europe is also the main source areas for trafﬁcked women
to Sweden (Englund et al. 2008; Forsman and Korsell 2008; Hagstedt,
Korsell, and Skagero¨ 2009). Ferry lines from Poland and Estonia make
travel to Sweden easy. Three main types of organizational structures
have been identiﬁed in Swedish research (Englund et al. 2008). First,
international networks can establish a “branch” in Sweden with local
connections. Second, perpetrators live in Sweden but have contacts in
other countries, where they recruit women to work in Sweden. Third,
criminal networks outside Sweden arrange “city tours” for men who
have booked their services in advance. The organizational level is in
general quite low. The “organization” consists often only of the prin-
cipal, one or two helpers, and a few women.
The customers have a negative attitude to trafﬁcking, which is de-
scribed in the media as modern slavery with threats and violence. This
form of prostitution is therefore organized with the women as self-
employed operators. These more subtle forms of control and repres-
sion are not always visible to the sex customers.
D. Money Laundering
Money laundering by organized crime seems to be a minor problem
in Scandinavia and there are considerable expenses for security ar-
rangements, losses, and loan losses. The “wage bill” is quite low be-
cause there is high reciprocity of favors (Skinnari and Korsell 2006;
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Skinnari, Vesterhav, and Korsell 2007; Vesterhav, Skinnari, and Korsell
2007). The lifestyle of many of those involved with organized crime
makes pubs, restaurants, car dealerships, apartments, and holiday re-
sorts logical investments (Skinnari and Korsell 2006; Skinnari, Vester-
hav, and Korsell 2007; Vesterhav, Skinnari, and Korsell 2007). Bar visits
and high restaurants bills are also expenses that are essential in order
to obtain useful information and make contacts.
Another question is how much organized crime money needs laun-
dering. One indicator that organized crime does not generate large
amounts of money is that little money from organized crime ends up
on the gambling tables and in the slot machines in Swedish interna-
tional casinos (Skinnari and Korsell 2006). There are few criminals of
sufﬁcient stature to generate income that is not used or recycled within
the illegal economy (Skinnari, Vesterhav, and Korsell 2007). The few
who have money to launder can quite easily invest it abroad without
questions being asked. Recently in Norway a large case unveiled sub-
stantial investments made in Brazilian resorts by Norwegian criminal
entrepreneurs from the Pakistani gangs. It is also documented that
money has been invested in hotels and real estate in Thailand and
Pakistan. There are similar examples from Finland and Sweden with
investments in businesses and real estate in Spain and Thailand ( Jun-
ninen 2006; Skinnari, Vesterhav, and Korsell 2007).
Not much money from organized crime seems to be laundered in
the Norwegian securities markets (Ingvaldsen 2006; Ingvaldsen and
Larsson 2007, 2009), and there are sound reasons why this might be
so. There is no easy access to the securities markets for most organized
criminals, their knowledge of these markets is at best limited, and they
have few acquaintances who work on the inside.
The regulation of money laundering has been criticized (O¨rnemark
Hansen 1998). It has developed from a narrow deﬁnition of money
laundering in connection with drugs to today’s wide and open deﬁni-
tion that focuses more on the act of laundering than on the source of
the money. The aims of regulation have changed from catching or-
ganized criminals to collecting ﬁnancial intelligence (Larsson 2008b).
The banks spearhead the ﬁght against money laundering in the ﬁ-
nancial sector and also bear most of the costs of surveillance and con-
trol (Larsson and Magnusson 2009). The estimated total annual cost
of regulation in recent years is approximately 200 million kroner in
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Norway and 400 million in Sweden (approximately $35 million and
$65 million).
IV. Organized Crime, the Legal Economy, and the
Political Sphere
In Networks in the Grey Zone, Per Ole Johansen (1996) observed that
one aspect of organized crime is its tendency to merge with legal busi-
nesses and the social fabric. “The bearing perspective of this book is
that organized crime is something more than lawbreakers operating in
the periphery of society” (p. 11). Johansen describes what he calls a
criminogenic ladder composed of three steps: on the ﬁrst step there
are private businesses that are victims of organized crime; on the mid-
dle step organized criminals and legal businesses swap roles or coop-
erate; and on the third step are alliances between organized criminals
and public authorities.
Norway stands with one foot on the ﬁrst step and the other barely
on the second according to Johansen (1996, 2008). The same assess-
ment could probably be made of the other Nordic countries. Legal
businesses are involved in fencing, smuggling, and systematic tax eva-
sion through organized forms of unreported and untaxed labor in the
underground economy. During World War II, businessmen sold ra-
tioned merchandise on the black market (Aubert 1950; Wijk 1992) and
they can also supply contraband alcohol and cigarettes. Corporations
and the self-employed can hire outlaw motorcycle gangs for debt col-
lection, especially in the case of more shadowy agreements, illegal
debts, and commercial conﬂicts.
The number of cases of extortion in Sweden has increased dramat-
ically and the general message from the police is that organized crime
has found a new opportunity for proﬁtable criminality (Rikskriminal-
polisen 2007; Wierup 2007; Korsell, Skinnari, and Vesterhav 2009).
However, this does not resemble extortion in many other countries,
where it often implies territorial dominance of a location. Extortion in
the Nordic countries is better characterized as an “ongoing robbery,”
but without guns and masks, which results in a high level of police
attention and activity. Businessmen who have something to hide from
the authorities, and who, for example, have dealt in stolen goods, used
untaxed labor, or hired debt collectors from organized crime groups,
are vulnerable and can easily become a target. If there is such a trend,
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and it appears there is, organized crime has moved to a qualitative level
within the business sector that is more than just theft, fencing, and
occasional fraud.
The Norwegian authorities have focused on mergers between legal
businesses and criminal groups.8 Certain businesses are prone to co-
operation with or inﬁltration by such groups—restaurants, automobile-
related businesses, trucking, and construction. Proﬁts from organized
crime have often been invested in restaurants, pubs, and car businesses.
The trucking business has often been associated with the trafﬁcking of
illegal or heavily taxed goods and with tax evasion (Lundgren Sørli
2005). There are also examples from more marginal points of the ﬁ-
nancial sector in the form of cooperation with organized crime groups
who act primarily as money and debt collectors. There have been many
warnings about the inﬁltration of the legal economy, but so far this has
been mostly at the fringes (Ingvaldsen and Larsson 2009).
Swedish studies do not reveal signiﬁcant indications that organized
criminals aspire to inﬁltrate the legal business world or to commit
crimes there (van Duyne et al. 2003; Skinnari, Vesterhav, and Korsell
2007). Drug entrepreneurs dream of a less risky and more convention-
ally accepted business as prosperous employers and owners of a res-
taurant or a construction company. Even a small pizzeria is something
to be proud of and to show off to one’s children and grandchildren. A
company of one’s own is therefore an ambition in the overstrained
entrepreneur’s dreams, and functions as a contrast to the unpleasant
side of running a criminal business, and not as a platform for criminal
expansion.
There are few signs that Nordic organized crime has succeeded in
signiﬁcant corruption of central authorities ( Johansen 2005; Walls-
tro¨m, Skinnari, and Korsell 2005). However, kickbacks do occur and
often take the form of private services or help. This sort of corruption
is usually economic rather than strictly organized crime, even if the
boundaries between them may often be blurred. There are two ways
to understand this low level of corruption. One is that police and cus-
tom ofﬁcers have high social standing and are well paid compared with
similar ofﬁcials in many other countries; they are usually viewed as
honest and incorruptible. Another is that there has been an excessive
8 This topic is always discussed in threat assessments made by the Oslo police and
the National Police Directorate.
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focus on corruption in the literature on organized crime. Organized
crime exists and thrives in many societies without massive corruption
of public ofﬁcials.9
V. Responses to Organized Crime
In view the relatively small scale of organized crime in the Nordic
countries, it may come as a surprise that governments have established
many initiatives to attack it. These include major national programs,
new legislation, and recent reallocations of police resources.
A. When Organized Crime Comes to Town
With the exception of a focus on high level drug distributors in the
1960s, organized crime and economic crime (white-collar crime) be-
came important topics in Sweden only in the 1970s (Lindgren 2000b;
Korsell 2006). In the other Nordic countries, the topic did not attract
much attention until the 1990s.
In the spring of 1976 the Swedish debate on organized and economic
crime became quite heated (AMOB 1977; Svensson 1982). The media
revealed the existence of serious covert criminality in Sweden’s secure
society: tax frauds, organized prostitution, illegal gambling clubs, in-
fringement of currency regulations, and illicit businesses involved with
real estate, companies, loans, cars, and supplying labor (AMOB 1977;
Heckscher 1980).
The City of Stockholm scrutinized the economic and organized
crime situation concerning illegal clubs (Persson and A˚stro¨m 1978),
illegal gambling (Persson and A˚stro¨m 1979), regulation of alcohol
(Griehsel and Warming 1980), prostitution and pimping (Persson
1980), and drug crime (Enroth and Lenke 1980). In Malmo¨, Larsson
and Ma˚nsson (1976) studied illegal clubs and prostitution (cf. Ma˚nsson
1981). The administrations of Sweden’s major cities quickly responded
to organized crime in ways that on a very small scale resembled later
efforts in New York City and Amsterdam (Jacobs 1999; Fijnaut 2002;
van de Bunt and van der Schoot 2003; van der Schoot 2006).
The Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention was given a
remit by the national government to scrutinize legislation against both
9 One example from the United States is Drug Smuggling by Gross (1992), who
observes that you should never try to corrupt police or customs ofﬁcers in the United
States; it will only get you into more trouble.
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organized and economic crime and to suggest changes (Lindgren
2000a; Korsell 2008). Reports covered receiving stolen goods (Bra˚
1978), illegal gambling (Bra˚ 1979a), stolen vehicles (Bra˚ 1979b), drug
crime (Bra˚ 1982), and loan sharking (Bra˚ 1983). However, after that
ambitious start, attention shifted in the early 1980s to economic crime.
Organized crime was largely forgotten (Lindgren 2000a; Korsell 2006).
Not until the 1990s was organized crime “rediscovered,” largely as a
result of EU membership. The growth in outlaw gangs and the Nordic
biker war also focused political attention on organized crime (Korsell,
Skinnari, and Vesterhav 2009).
From the end of the 1970s until the end of the 1990s, drugs were
the most important crime problem in Norway. In the late 1990s, or-
ganized crime gradually replaced drugs as the most important issue in
Norwegian criminal policy. During 1992 the Hells Angels recruited
the motor cycle club Rowdies in Trondheim (Larsson 2008b). The
resulting media discussions, in which the Hells Angels were labeled
criminals by the police chief of Trondheim, demonstrated the wide-
spread use of the term. The chief stated, “Membership, as we know
from other countries, is conditional upon purely criminal activities such
as theft, robbery, violence, and murder in order to obtain money for
the club” (Larsson 2008b, p. 13). However, there were other changes
as well. One was the widely perceived new “threat” from the East with
the fall of the Soviet Union and the Berlin Wall.
In Denmark organized crime was for a long time not a major issue
(Cornils and Greve 2004). It became an issue in connection with the
biker gangs, which became a problem in Denmark earlier than in the
other Nordic countries. There is limited research in Denmark on or-
ganized crime other than Bay’s work on the bikers (Bay 1992, 1994,
1998).
In Finland, organized crime became an issue in the 1990s in con-
nection with the biker gangs (Viuhko and Jokinen 2009). The gangs
intensiﬁed their recruitment and became more powerful. The prox-
imity of Russia and the cultural links to Estonia, in combination with
the systematic deregulation of the economy and globalization, made
organized crime an important topic. Estonians and Russians play a
quite important role in Finnish organized crime. Finland has an exter-
nal border within the European Union and is also a transit country
for, for example, illegal immigration and trafﬁcking.
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B. Legislation
“The notion of organized crime and its related policy package has
remained until now particularly controversial in Denmark and most
other Scandinavian countries,” Fijnaut and Paoli observed in their am-
bitious survey (2004, p. 5). In some respects this statement remains
correct, but there are nuanced differences in the policy approaches in
the Nordic countries.
One example of a more reluctant position is the Swedish debate on
the government’s proposed use of hidden microphones (bugging) by
the police. The legislative process took many years; evaluation of the
effects was reduced to a short period. The debate has been intensive
on several new items of legislation described by their critics as threats
to citizens’ privacy. These new laws are referred to as the “Bodstro¨m
society,” after a former minister of justice.
There have been discussions in Norway about special police methods
against organized crime. One controversial topic is the use of paid
informers, which is viewed as an ethically questionable approach.
The statement by Fijnaut and Paoli is not entirely correct. Nordic
laws concerning organized crime have, to a considerable extent, been
adopted and implemented in imitation of international law, especially
EU law, but also of more United States–oriented legislation such as
that pertaining to money laundering and follow-the-money regulations
(Larsson and Magnusson 2009). There have been few original contri-
butions to the statutory approach for combating organized crime in
the Nordic countries. We are typically importers, and the key phrase
and activity is the harmonization of laws (Cornils and Greve 2004).
Finland has criminalized participation in criminal groups. Member-
ship in organized crime groups or networks has not been criminalized
in Norway, Denmark, and Sweden, although a Swedish governmental
committee presented such a proposal ( Justitiedepartementet 2000).
However, Norwegian, Danish, and Swedish criminal courts may assess
a criminal act as more severe and deserving a harsher punishment if it
was related to organized crime.
In Denmark considerable political attention was, and is still, paid to
biker groups and the trade in hashish. This attention resulted in special
laws passed against the bikers, such as the “rockerloven” from 1996
(Cornils and Greve 2004). The police can ban a member or associate
of Hells Angels and Bandidos from particular premises. According to
the Hashish Club Act of 2001, the police can prohibit a person from
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receiving visitors on such premises and also prohibit visitors from being
present there (Cornils and Greve 2004).
C. Special Enforcement Bodies and Activities
Several dramatic events took place in Sweden during the autumn of
2007. The home of a prosecutor was bombed and property was de-
stroyed. The prosecutor, well known for investigating outlaw gangs,
was not at home. The police related the attack to her work. A spec-
tacular post ofﬁce robbery took place in Gothenburg, the second larg-
est city in Sweden, and seven cars were set on ﬁre in the early rush
hour in order to confuse the police. In the same city, street gangs
armed with guns opened ﬁre on the streets and a police helicopter was
shot at. Earlier the apartment of another prosecutor was shot at and
hit by bullets. These incidents, attributable to the growth of street
gangs and outlaw motorcycle gangs, were recently described in the
bestseller Swedish Maﬁa (Wierup and Larsson 2007). Massive media
attention forced the government to take action (Korsell 2008).
The minister of justice published a report with the dramatic title
“National Mobilization against Serious Organized Crime” (Korsell
2008). The focus on organized crime has had wide-ranging conse-
quences for the police. Eight regional intelligence centers have now
been set up (Schoultz et al. 2009). Ofﬁcials from different authorities
(police, customs, tax) using their respective databases are surveying or-
ganized crime on the basis of different projects, and there is also a
national intelligence center. Another change is the establishment of one
national and eight regional task forces to which 200 ofﬁcials, most of
them police ofﬁcers, have been assigned.
The Economic Crime Authority has established a national unit to
work with asset recovery. The “go-for-the-money” approach is also an
important aspect of this “mobilization.” The Swedish National Council
for Crime Prevention has been given a governmental assignment to
support local communities in their collaboration with local authorities
and organizations (Eliasson et al. 2009). A large number of projects
have been started. One example is in the county of Va¨rmland, where
the local university is making a survey of local problems with organized
crime. The results will be combined with police information to draw
up a plan together with the communities to counteract organized
crime. In the same county, members of Hells Angels have recently been
involved in a large-scale tax fraud in construction businesses.
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In Norway the ideals governing the police specify that they be gen-
eralists and civilian in style; as a rule, they are unarmed (Høigard, in
this volume). To meet the challenges of more complex and cross-
border crimes, the police have set up specialist teams devoted to such
cases.
“Catch” was established in 2001 and consisted of two investigative
teams staffed by personnel from the Oslo Police Department, the
National Criminal Investigation Service (NCIS), and the National Au-
thority for Investigation and Prosecution of Economic and Environ-
mental Crime (Økokrim). It specializes in the investigation of orga-
nized crime and its mandate is primarily to investigate complex major
cases and to monitor ﬁgures in the world of organized crime. “The
project [Catch] shall ﬁght the top dogs behind serious drug crimes and
other forms of organized crime such as smuggling and money laun-
dering associated with this” (Politidirektoratet 2003a, p. 7). Catch was
an experimental project and has been an integral part of NCIS since
2005. Many of the experts on organized crime who came to work at
Catch were from the Oslo Police Department.
The Council for Coordinated Action against Organized Crime
(ROK) was established in 2000. Its role was to fund the local police
for their investigation of major complex cases, but the local police must
ﬁrst apply for these resources. Many ROK cases have related to the
smuggling and handling of drugs and narcotics. In 2005, the ROK
secretariat was transferred from the National Police Directorate to
NCIS.
The largest team of police experts on organized crime is found in
Oslo. There were approximately 240 employees in the organized crime
section in 2008, although the total number working with organized
crime is higher (Larsson 2008a). These ﬁgures may look small to for-
eign readers but remember that the total number of working police
ofﬁcers in Norway is approximately 9,000. The “gang project,” as it is
called, has been running since 2006 and involved some 110 police of-
ﬁcers; they outnumber the number of gang members. Most known
organized crime groups in Norway are in the central southeastern re-
gion around Oslo.
In Denmark in 1995, the Ministry of Justice launched an “Action
Plan on Organized Crime and Biker Crime” (Cornils and Greve 2004).
In 2002 the police announced increased action against the bikers. On
a local level, civil society has also taken active part in making it harder
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for outlaw motorcycle groups and other gangs to establish themselves
and operate (Eliasson et al. 2009). Communities apply legislation on
land use to buy properties or reclaim usage. The social insurance of-
ﬁces can review social welfare payments to gang members, the ﬁre
brigade has the power to check the safety of gang-owned premises, and
the police stop motorcycles and check them according to trafﬁc safety
rules. The authorities use administrative regulations to make it harder
for outlaw gangs to establish themselves (Horsens Kommune and Hor-
sens politi 2004). Several communities in Sweden have recently fol-
lowed the Danish example and tried in different ways to get rid of the
gangs. Nordic and international police cooperation is strong in relation
to “biker crime.”
Nordic cooperation takes many forms, one of which, Politi, Toll i
Norden (PTN), denotes collaboration among the police and customs
authorities. These initiatives have often been described as functioning
well in efforts to regulate smuggling and trafﬁcking. The idea behind
PTN, which has existed since 1984, is to get the police and customs
to work together against smuggling (Bakken 1997).
Since 1992, the Nordic countries have had joint Nordic liaison of-
ﬁcers in Spain, the Netherlands, Great Britain, Pakistan, and Russia.
Their role is to focus on drug-related crimes, production, and smug-
gling routes in countries of importance. Since 1996 they have had a
generalist role, undertaken intelligence collection, assisted with making
connections and contacts in concrete criminal cases, and performed a
broad range of other police-related tasks. “The liaison ofﬁcers are
obliged to seek cooperation with all signiﬁcant regulatory authorities,
and they shall on their own initiative gather and pass on relevant in-
formation on organized crime. They do not perform operational tasks”
(Bakken 1997, p. 10).
VI. The Future
Organized crime remains a limited problem in the Nordic countries
( Johansen 1996; Larsson 2008b; Korsell, Skinnari, and Vesterhav
2009). This does not mean that it is not worrisome or does not cause
damage to or threaten society. The question is what the immediate
future will bring and whether organize crime will cause more damage
or pose a greater threat to society.
One obvious trend over the past 20 years has been the proliferation
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of gangs: bikers, youth gangs in the suburbs, and prison-based and
ethnic gangs. Even if many of these do not look like stereotypical
organized crime problems as other countries understand the term, they
threaten people, and citizens wonder why the police and other au-
thorities do not stop them. There is a risk that the gangs will under-
mine public conﬁdence in the ability of society to maintain law and
order, and we must ask ourselves whether the number of gangs will
increase. The Swedish government, at least, has recently made great
efforts to combat organized crime, but it is still too early to say how
this will affect the number of gangs (Korsell, Skinnari, and Vesterhav
2009).
Organized crime is to some extent more involved with legitimate
businesses than in earlier times as a supplier of illicit workers, often in
construction, and as debt collectors and extortionists (Korsell, Skinnari,
and Vesterhav 2009). We could ask, with reference to Johansen (1996,
2008), whether organized crime is slowly moving up toward the middle
step of the ladder where organized criminals and legal business swaps
roles or cooperate. In any case, organized crime operates on a small
scale. There are many criminal entrepreneurs with limited resources
and ambitions who have no inﬂuence over politics, the media, or the
business community.
Organized crime is highly adaptive to societal changes. Trafﬁcking
of illegal or heavily taxed commodities will always offer opportunities
to entrepreneurial individuals and groups with the right connections,
as the history of alcohol smuggling proves.
Organized crime is a highly political concept. Changes in legislation
and regulation, international agreements, pressure groups, the media,
and the economic resources given to the police force are among the
important factors that give the content to this concept. The Swedish
and Norwegian zero-tolerance line toward drugs has given these sub-
stances top priority in the eyes of the police. The vast resources com-
mitted to this war have exaggerated the picture of the drug problem
in Nordic societies and have increased the numbers of prisoners serv-
ing sentences for drug-related crimes.
Globalization and the pressure from developing countries and de-
stabilized conﬂict-ridden areas of the world, in combination with
tightly closed borders surrounding the European Union, motivate traf-
ﬁcking in human beings, especially for the purpose of labor exploita-
tion and prostitution. At the same time, there are obvious problems
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inside the European Union and Schengen, with the combination of
open borders and vast differences in economic opportunities, also for
entrepreneurial criminal groups. Growth in mobile criminal groups is
expected, mainly from former Eastern European countries.
How these problems are tackled through criminalization or other
political and social measures will affect the future of organized crime
in the Nordic countries.
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